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BROADCASTING AND GOVERNMENT. By Walter B. Emery. East Lansing:
Michigan State University Press, 1961. Pp. xxiv, 482. $7.50.
MR. Emery's book is a valuable guide for newcomers to broadcast regulation
although, as such, it will undoubtedly be more useful for university courses
than for specialists in the field. The major controversies are all reviewed, at
least sketchily, along with historical, technical and legal background. Because
the author does not set himself the task of analysis or critical evaluation so
much as one of descriptive exposition, he necessarily leaves himself open to
criticism on that score. Yet anyone familiar with the intricacies and technical
mechanics of broadcast regulation can rejoice at having available for general
reference still another lucid, well-structured survey of the essential rudiments
of governmental policy towards a major communications medium. The exten-
sive Appendix materials are well-chosen and provocative.
Publication of this volume gives us pause to reconsider the long road
travelled by broadcast regulation during the past thirty years, and provides a
convenient vantage point for doing so at a time when the market for regula-
tory reform is particularly active. Rather than undertake any perfunctory re-
view of what is basically a straightforward survey of regulatory process and
substance, I shall limit my comments to one fundamental issue: the re-
quirements for efficient rationing of scarce broadcast spectrum space by ad-
ministrative rather than market techniques, and the difficulty of formulating
meaningful rationing criteria.
This reviewer could not help but emerge from Mr. Emery's book with a
new sense of at least one stark alternative facing broadcast regulation today.
Either the criteria by which licenses are awarded and frequencies allocated
must be specified more concretely, with more rigorous, systematic research
into their underlying premises-by social scientists, lawyers and engineers, or
greater use must be made of such alternative techniques as competitive bid-
ding for new grants, transfers and renewals, taxes and subsidies geared to
influence broadcast structure and behavior, or public yardstick operations.'
Mr. Emery does not pose the problem in this way; but the sweep of his book
underlines the need to make such hard choices. Indeed, at least part of the
endless controversy in this field, between industry and government, may well
be due to the failure of both parties to do just that.
Stated otherwise, if direct rationing-allocation techniques are used, the
needed political support and public confidence in Commission integrity must
1. Competitive bidding has never been particularly popular in the broadcast field and
Emery may have excluded it from his brief catalogue of remedial possibilities on that score
(ch. 24). But the stark alternative it poses to existing practice in some ways strikes at the
heart of many long-standing sources of conflict between regulator and regulated in this
politically sensitive area, and therefore deserved at least cursory attention in so broad a
survey as this. See extended discussion of competitive bidding in Coase, The Federal Coln-
munications Commission, 2 J. LAw & EcoN. 1 (1959) ; Note, 18 U. CaI. L. REv. 802, 811-16
(1951). Aspects of all three alternatives-bidding, subsidies and public operations-are re-
viewed in Levin, Regulatory Efficiency, Reform and the FCC, 50 GEo. L.J. 1 (1961).
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be maintained by demonstrating their equity, reasonableness and validity.
Congress and Commission alike must be more willing to authorize and
execute studies of the standards which underlie the techniques;2 and the
industry must also be positive and constructive in its attitude toward such
studies.3 If either or both parties are unwilling to accept the full logic of the
direct rationing-allocation approach, they must then face up to the implica-
tions of alternative arrangements, one of which--competitive bidding-is
particularly pertinent here.
The point can be clarified further by reviewing five well-known bones of
contention between the FCC and the broadcast industry. First is the fact
of the Commission's intervention in impersonal market processes through
the imposition of standards which afford priorities to broadcast applicants
with certain qualifications (including those with certain kinds of program
proposals or past performance records), located in communities with certain
social-economic characteristics. The major contexts in which these standards
have been hammered out are the comparative hearing forum 4 and the major
rule-making proceeding.; In both cases administrative intervention has altered
to varying degrees what would otherwise result from the free play of market
forces.
In comparative licensing decisions, small businesses new to broadcasting
and unaffiliated with other media are sometimes preferred to strategically
placed multiple owners with choice network or newspaper ties in the im-
mediate area or in other markets. In such cases one might say that the ration-
ing of valuable privileges by the FCC alters the distribution of operating
rights that might otherwise result from competitive bidding for the licenses. 6
To be sure, the Commission has actually decided in favor of the latter kind of
candidate (who would probably win in an open price competition anyway)
as often as in favor of the former (who would probably lose) .7 But the fact
2. The FCC's failure to apply a "study technique" in the preparation of its TV Alloca-
tion Plan of 1952 is a good case in point. See Report of the Ad Hoc Advisory Committee on
Allocations to the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 1958, 46-47,
78-79, 245-50 [hereafter cited as Bowles Report]. This contrasts with notable use of a "study
technique" in the Commission's investigation of network broadcasting. House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Network Broadcasting, H.R. REP. No. 1297, 85th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1958) [hereinafter cited as Report on Network Broadcasting].
3. Components of the industry are sometimes reluctant to cooperate fully in providing
all needed information. See Report on Network Broadcasting at 7-8.
4. EMERY, ch. 14. Comparative hearings arise where several applicants, each qualified to
serve in the public interest, compete for a single broadcast grant and where the Commission
must determine who is the best qualified. Such hearings are said to provide a forum to
explore the full range of factors that may add to or detract from a candidate's ability to
serve the public. Report on Network Broadcasting at 59.
5. EMERY, ch. 9.
6. At least, this is true insofar as large wealthy candidates with readier access to an
imperfect capital market could otherwise outbid rival bidders at public auctions.
7. For example, a classification of comparative TV hearings according to whether local
residence, integrated ownership or diversified ownership tipped the balance in favor of what
is generally a smaller, less wealthy applicant, or were overridden in favor of a larger,
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remains that absent any auctioning of new broadcast grants the FCC must
in some 10 per cent of all licensing cases interpose its judgment and choose
between rival applicants with roughly equal qualifications in very close races
for choice grants in the most lucrative markets. Likewise, unless it were to
utilize a first-come-first-served standard and allow available market support
alone to determine the location of broadcast stations, the Commission must
also pre-determine the number of outlets allowed to operate in the various
size markets.8 My point is simply that whenever a regulatory authority in-
terferes with impersonal market processes, those who are regulated tend to
make such actions a target for otherwise undirected criticism. The broadcast
industry is no exception to this tendency. On the contrary, the elusive charac-
ter of its service standards, its unique technology, and its crucial political-
cultural function, combine to render the industry particularly sensitive to such
interference.
A second clash arises over the validity of the Commission's rationing cri-
teria. It is sometimes contended that the local applicant with no other media
connections, knowledgeable in community affairs and active in civic matters, but
without broadcast experience, may in fact be far less able to serve his com-
munity than an outsider with long experience and greater resources, even
though affiliated with other media and other stations. The criticism is not
that local, diversified or integrated ownership tips the balance in every con-
tested case, but rather that such factors should play no role at all, in view
of the absence of convincing evidence that they will in fact guarantee "better
service," or even a wider range of program options than otherwise. Criticized
also are those allocation policies geared to promote local stations in un-
economic markets at the expense of more numerous high-powered, big-city
signals,9 and still other policies geared to maximize multi-signal areas at the
wealthier enterprise, reveals that the latter was true in 12 cases out of 23 (for local resi-
dence), in 14 cases out of 35 (for integrated ownership), and in 9 cases out of 19 (for diver-
sified ownership). See Schwartz, Comparative Television and the Chancellor's Foot, 47 GEo.
L.J. 655, 666-89 (1959). Some cases are classified under more than one decisional criterion.
8. This actually was done in the Television Allocation Plan of 1952. See FCC, Sixth Re-
port and Order in re Docket No. 8736 (April 14, 1952). The Commission sought to assign at
least one service to all areas, at least one station to all communities, multiple services and
multiple stations to as many areas and communities as possible. Id., 111 3, 63-68. It also re-
served 242 TV channels for non-commercial, education use. Id., 1111 60, 69, 84. But even in the
standard broadcast band situation, where ad hoc methods interfere less with the strict
economic determinants of new station entry than the pre-engineered TV plan does, the
designation of clear, regional and local channels has precluded any real first-come-first-
served standard. Nor has the absence of a pre-engineered plan in standard broadcasting
precluded the development of identical criteria to guide the distribution of operating rights.
Compare Extended Broadcast Hours for Daytime Stations, 25 F.C.C. 1135 ffff 6-9 (1958),
and Clear-Channel Broadcasting in the Standard Broadcast Band, 24 F.C.C. 303, ff 12-18
(1958); with F.C.C., Sixth Report and Order in re Docket No. 8736, 111 3, 63-68 (April 14,
1952).
9. E.g., Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce




expense of local community stations.10 Yet, assuming that program diversity,
wide geographic service and signal quality are desiderata, the FCC can now
hardly afford not to intervene in the broadcast industry. The problem, as
noted, is to make sure that all its proximate regulatory criteria are sound in
fact as well as in appearance.
A third set of factors creating industry discontent is the time-consuming
character of the Commission's rationing procedures and their costliness-both
in terms of the resources dissipated in using or circumventing such procedures
and the capitalized value of the income foregone during the long periods of
negotiation. These delays have averaged some 14 months between the end
of initial screening and the time of final grants of a construction permit in
comparative TV licensing cases, and have run as high as 3Y2 years in the
formulation of a final Allocation Plan for television. Futile deliberations over
breaking down the clear channels to facilitate new station entry into numerous
A.M. radio communities, have occurred, on and off, since 1946.11 Obviously
no candidate anxious to enter a lucrative market relishes such artificial bar-
riers as those described here. And yet, the millions of dollars dissipated
through long delays and deliberations, are not ipso facto too high a price to
pay for a truly judicious distribution of scarce operating rights. The large
sum simply underlines once more the vital importance of establishing the
desirability of the Commission's ultimate norm (program diversity) and the
validity of the proximate criteria used to implement that norm. It underlines
also the need to appraise the efficiency of existing regulatory techniques.
A fourth possible source of resentment may well be the broadcasters' reluc-
tance to be placed in a position of having to outpromise each other on paper
in vying for the same license grant, or to make exorbitant offers for distinctive
program service in tactical maneuvers either to prevent the reservation of valu-
able frequencies for educational institutions or to ward off impending congres-
sional inroads in the program field, only to slide back to an earlier position
of "normalcy" (given the realities of advertiser economics) once the "heat is
off." These pressures to widen and enrich program choice might well exist
irrespective of the present licensing-allocation apparatus; but that apparatus,
and the technical-institutional framework which underlies it, clearly intensify
10. Id. at 810-19, 826-28; criticism, id. at 859-61, and id. at 452-54, and also in Hearings
Before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 2, vol. 1, at 3269-70 (1957).
11. "Clear channels" refer to 60 of 107 standard broadcast channels on which one or
more dominant stations serve wide areas free of interference in their primary service areas
and over most or all of their secondary areas. FCC RULE 3.21(a). Until recently 24 of
the 47 United States clear channels were reserved exclusively for a single class I-A station
at night, operating fulltime with 50 kilowatts power. It is estimated that more than 150 low-
powered local stations could in fact operate on any clear channel were the rules changed to
permit this. Signal quality and service to remote rural areas are still cited to justify the
continued restrictions on entry, although these restrictions were recently relaxed on 13' of
the choicest United States channels. See FCC, Report and Order in re Docket No. 6741
(Clear Channel Broadcasting), Sept. 14, 1961, 1111 -21, 54-62.
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the problem. Once more, the solution is either to reconstruct the present
rationing apparatus by renewed inquiry into viable rationing criteria, or else
to institute a new rationing device based in part on competitive bidding for
operating rights.
Finally, even more objectionable to broadcasters than the imposition of
rationing criteria under present licensing-allocation practice is the possibility
that identical procedures may one day be applied in transfer and renewal
cases, notwithstanding the probable impairment of industrial efficiency and
growth.1 2 For if the Commission's rationing effort is to be consistent and
effective, it is the height of folly to impose at the outset and at great cost to
taxpayers social priorities in favor of candidates with certain attributes, only
to have these priorities completely subverted by the free market for broadcast
stations at transfer time.13 Arguably, the present imposition of direct rationing
criteria on new grantees must be followed by the imposition of comparable
criteria in transfer and renewal cases, unless the present free market trading
of stations is accompanied by separate bidding for the seller's license.
14
In short, the industry's continued irritation over existing unverified licens-
ing-allocation criteria and inefficient FCC procedures, is understandable, but
quite beside the point. Broadcasters (no less than broadcast regulators) simply
cannot have their cake and eat it too. Nor does the fact that existing criteria
are deficient and often based on no definitive empirical studies change the
nature of the problem in any fundamental way, for systematic studies of the
costs and benefits of particular criteria in terms of the Commission's several
basic standards might help rectify this.
To be sure, even thorough studies may fail to enhance the efficiency of regu-
latory techniques without a clear mandate from Congress, and continuous
public support. This is amply clear from the endless debates over permissible
and impermissible network practices, notwithstanding extensive inquiries in
1939-41, and again in 1955-58.15 But the frequent disputes over the wisdom
of breaking down the clear channels have long remained unresolved, and the
status quo perpetuated by default for lack of up-to-date social and economic
data which the Commission either failed to produce at all, or, having pro-
duced, failed to act on quickly enough.' 6 The emphasis on local and diversi-
fied ownership has continued over the years despite the absence of any really
definitive empirical inquiry. Finally, the Commission's inability to implement
its several social priorities simultaneously through a comprehensive Tele-
vision Allocation Plan, notwithstanding 3Y2 years of preliminary inquiry and
testimony, has also been attributed to deficient empirical inquiry at the out-
set.17 In brief, so long as the Commission rations scarce broadcast frequencies
12. See notes 21-23 infra.
13. EmmaY, ch. 20.
14. See discussion in Levin, Regulatory Efficiency, Reform and the FCC, 50 GEO. L.J.
1, 22-37 (1961).
15. EMERY, pp. 228-32.
16. Id. at 91-93.
17. See note 2 supra.
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directly, it must use rationing criteria of some sort; and if these criteria are
not re-examined and periodically in the light of systematic research into their
end effects and their consistency with each other, Commission behavior is
likely to become the mere result of ex parte pressures, hunches and political
expediency.18
In this regard, it has been proposed, in recent years, that the Commission
adopt a prime time rule,' 9 a compulsory political time rule, 20 a rule giving
priority to local applicants for new grants (or transfer rights),21 a rule
prohibiting concurrent newspaper ownership in highly concentrated areas,
a rule establishing a presumption for diversified ownership in all new licens-
ing and transfer decisions, and, under certain conditions, in renewal cases
too,23 and a new, more stringent multiple ownership rule.24 Such proposals
emerge from long-standing regulatory experience in handling ad hoc licens-
ing and transfer cases, especially in the comparative forum. They would
obviously reduce elements of unpredictability in the Commission's behavior
and conceivably implement its entry control policies more effectively. But
before Congress or the Commission can commit itself squarely, systematic
inquiries into costs and benefits are badly needed.
By way of undertaking one such inquiry, this reviewer focused extensive
attention on the Commission's so-called newspaper policy.25 Evidence un-
covered 26 led to the conclusion that it is now time to reconsider how the
18. A most disconcerting example of this is documented in Schwartz, supra note 7,
at 685-99. The Commission's contradictory behavior in favoring newspapers over non-news-
papers in situations virtually identical with those where it had previously done the opposite,
id. at 685-89, is shown to be perfectly consistent with overriding political considerations. Id.
at 689-93. Notwithstanding similar qualifications in many cases Schwartz found that during
Eisenhower's administration "some nine Democratic newspapers [were] denied tele-
vision licenses, while eight papers which [were] Republican or Eisenhower Democrats
[were] awarded channels. No newspaper which supported Stevenson at the election before
its case was decided ... received a channel, except in one case where such paper was a co-
applicant with a leading Eisenhower paper." Id. at 693.
19. See H.R. 9549, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., § 8 (1960), and FCC Docket No. 12782
(Study of Radio-TV Network Broadcasting), Jan. 1960, at 295, 631, 2593-95.
20. See S. 3171, 86th Cong. 2d Sess. (1960); S. REP. No. 1539, 86th Cong. 2d Sess.
(1960).
21. See H.R. 9549, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., §§ 9, 11 (1960) ; and H.R. 11893, 85th Cong.,
2d Sess., §§ 6, 8 (1959) ; Report on Network Broadcasting at 659-60, especially recom-
mendations 28-30; Special Subcommittee on Legislative Oversight of the Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Independent Regulatory Commissions, H.R. RaP. No.
2711, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1959).
22. H.R. 9486, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960).
23. Report on Network Broadcasting at 659-60, especially recommendations 28-30.
24. Report on Network Broadcasting at 584-99; id. at 659-60, especially recommenda-
tions 31-33.
25. LEviN, BROADCAST REGULATION AND JOINT OWNERSHIP OF MEDIA (1960).
26. Ibid. The major findings are that there is (or has been) an official encouragement of
broadcast editorializing by more and more stations, in recent years, notwithstanding the well-
known partisanship of newspaper licensees in their printed editorial columns, id. at 80 n.12;
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Commission's policy may best be tightened in areas of concentrated control,
and what the net effect would be on program diversity and balance. The
fact that such an inquiry might not have been necessary if the Commission
did not have to act as a rationing-allocation board in distributing valuable
operating rights is significant, but quite beside the point. There is no alterna-
tive to such inquiries under the present system. This does not mean that they
are easy to conduct, or free of methodological pitfalls. But to say that social
science techniques have no contribution to make, or to write off all FCC
licensing-allocation criteria as empty shibboleths, is to reveal a total misunder-
standing of the Commission's unavoidable rationing function and of its role
in protecting the public interest. Nor can we really shrug off the problem by
dismissing licensee control of programming as an empty "legal fiction" in
contrast with the admittedly hard realities of the ties between networks,
advertisers and station owners. The rationing problem remains, and so does
the need for valid criteria.
The improvement of broadcast regulation is at best a joint venture for
lawyers, public administrators and social scientists at large. One of the
economist's possible contributions is to demonstrate the potential role of the
pricing system in allocating scarce spectrum space, and of taxes and subsidies
as mechanisms to implement existing regulatory objectives. But short of so
sweeping a change in regulatory techniques as would institute outright com-
petitive bidding for broadcast frequencies, and subsidization of public service
programming,2 7 with or without direct public ownership of key facilities, he
must surely aid in periodic joint efforts to overhaul the existing licensing-
allocation criteria. Above all, he may help by trying to estimate the costs and
benefits of bold steps to crystallize these criteria.
HARVEY J. LMWNt
a continued existence of many communities where the only daily newspaper owns the only
radio station, and of other communities where a radio station tied to the only newspaper
competes for advertising revenue against a second unaffiliated station, id. at 77-78, 80-81; no
convincing evidence that substantial economies resulted in joint newspaper-radio enterprises,
id. ch. 4, or that strategic segments of the older media cannot survive effectively in competi-
tion with radio-TV by making organizational-product adjustments, id. chs. 5-6; at least
some evidence that intermedia competitive adjustments will be greater when the media are
unaffiliated, and that intermedia competition leads different media to seek out and exploit
their distinctive properties and relative advantages and to try to stabilize their incomes by
focusing on the needs their rivals tend relatively to neglect, id. chs. 5-6.
27. See H.R. 9549, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960), and discussion in Levin, Regudator y
Efficiency, Reform and the FCC, 50 Gao. L. J. 1 (1961).
tChairman, Department of Economics, Hofstra College.
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